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number of interviews), and to recognize the right to interview jurors
to determine if any possibly prejudicial remarks were made to them
or were overheard. Such a modification would insure impartiality of
the jury while protecting the jury members from embarassment or
harassment.42
WILLIAM KNIGHT ZEWADSKI

PUBLIC FINANCE: A NEW TEST FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE
O'Neill v. Burns, 198 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967)
The Florida Legislature enacted a statute appropriating 50,000
dollars to be paid to "Junior Chamber International for the creation
of permanent headquarters in the state of Florida."' The statute
provided that the money was not to be paid until a Florida municipality2 pledged an equal amount of money or value in land or buildings. Plaintiffs brought suit seeking an injunction and a declaration
that the statute was invalid on the ground that the appropriation
constituted a pledge or loan of the credit of the state for a nonpublic
purpose in violation of article IX, section 10, of the Florida Constitution. Plaintiffs claimed that granting money to an organization whose
only function was coordinating activities of chambers of commerce of
member nations was not a public purpose. The state contended that
the appropriation qualified as a public purpose because of the advertising benefit derived from postmarks and return addresses on letterheads and envelopes of matter mailed from Miami Beach. The
Chancellor of the Second Judicial Circuit sustained the appropriation
on the ground that the advertising benefit constituted a legitimate
public purpose. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court HELD, that
42. As to the propriety of post-conviction interviews under the ethics of the
American Bar Association, see ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Emcs, No. 23, as
interpreted in ABA Commrrrz OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, Opinion 109

(1934)
ON

(forbidding post-conviction interviews) and modified by ABA Cosmrrrz

PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS,

INFORMAL

DECISIONS,

Informal

Decision

535

(1962)

(permitting such interviews for "self-education, or where necessary to prevent
fraud or a miscarriage of justice"). See also Harnsberger, Amend Canon 23 or
Revise Opinion 109, 51 A.B.A.J. 157 (1965); Comment, 10 OKLA. L. REv. 174 (1957).
1. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-277, at 990.
2. The headquarters had been in Miami Beach for the last ten years, and it
was presumed that Junior Chamber International would remain there.
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this alleged benefit to the state was only "incidental" and that no
semblance of the necessary control over the contemplated appropriation was retained by the state. 3 Judgment reversed, Justices Ervin,
Thornal, and Roberts dissenting.
The question: What is a public purpose? has been subjected to
a barrage of interpretations in cases involving both tax exemptions
and governmental appropriations. 4 The result is a confusing variety
of tests used by courts to determine public purpose. The following
tests have been determinative in particular cases: Is the recipient a
quasi-public or private corporation? 5 Is the public benefit primary or
incidental to the over-all purpose? 6 Is the recipient a non-profitmaking or profitmaking corporation? 7 O'Neill adds a new test: To what
degree does the public maintain control after the money has been
disbursed?8
Little historical consistency is evident in the court's efforts to
lay guidelines for the determination of what constitutes public purpose. All the decisions have been based on article IX of the Florida
Constitution, 9 which explicitly restricts county and municipal appropriations but which says nothing about state appropriations. Section
10, the section on which the principal case is based, provides in part:'
The credit of the state shall not be pledged or loaned to any
individual, company, corporation or association. .
Legislature shall not authorize any county [or] city .

The
. to ob-

. .
.

tain or appropriate money for or to loan its credit to any
corporation, association, institution or individual.
3. On petition for rehearing the state urged the court to consider a lease
from the city of Miami Beach to Junior Chamber International, dated May 18,
1966. The court denied the rehearing on the ground that it was not in the
record on appeal and not pertinent to the basic issue involved.
4. Although the concept of public purpose arises in public appropriation
and tax exemption areas, this comment is limited to public appropriations.
5. Raney v. City of Lakeland, 88 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1956).
6. State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
7. Bailey v. City of Tampa, 92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 119 (1926).
8. This test has often been used in other jurisdictions. See City & County
of San Francisco v. Ross, 45 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955); Opinion to the
Governor, 76 R.I. 365, 70 A.2d 817 (1950).
9. Section 5 of article IX is not considered by the court in the present case
but is significant in that it forms the basis for the public purpose doctrine as
pertains to public appropriations. This section empowers the legislature to
authorize counties and municipalities to impose taxes for only county and
municipal purposes. The restriction would, by implication, include appropriations since that is the purpose of taxation. Section 5 is not considered in the
present case because there is no reference to state taxing power, only county and
municipal powers.
10. FLA. CoNs'r. art. IX, §10. (Emphasis added.)
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A careful reading of the section shows that the state restriction applies
only to lending and pledging credit, whereas the city and county
restriction applies to appropriations as well as credit. In other words,
when read literally the section seems to restrict only the state's lending
of credit and not state appropriations. 1 However, through the opinions of the attorney general' 2 the section has been extended to include
public purpose restrictions on state appropriations.
Section 10 of article IX was adopted in 1875 as an amendment
to the constitution of 1868." As originally enacted the intent was to
"forbid [the state, counties, and municipalities from] . . . engaging
directly or indirectly in commercial enterprises for profit."' 4 Prior to
the amendment cities and counties, as well as the state, had become
involved in guaranteeing the security of many private commercial institutions. Many failed and the government became responsible for
their debts. The early cases interpreted the section 10 prohibition
strictly and applied it only to aid by public funds to private, profitmaking corporations. 1 The present case, however, has expanded the
scope of section 10 to include nonprofit, quasi-public corporations.
The early fifties marked a sharp upturn in the number of cases
requiring a determination of public purpose. For a short time the
court was consistent in giving wide latitude to the definition of public purpose,' 6 but more recently the guidelines for determining public
purpose have become confusing. In 1960, the court balked at a proposal to develop an industrial tract in State v. Suwannee County Development Authorityy7 holding that the public purpose was only
incidental to the private benefit of the project. Yet, it granted a
public purpose tax exemption in Daytona Beach Racing District, Inc.
11. Article VIII of the Proposed Revised Florida Constitution of Nov. 10,
1966, would have the same defect since its provisions are in essence the same as
those in the present constitution.
12.

Ops. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 058-258 (1958).

13. FLA. CoNsr. art. 12, §7 (1875).
14. Bailey v. City of Tampa, 92 Fla. 1030, 1035, 111 So. 119, 120 (1926).
15. Bailey v. City of Tampa, 92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 119 (1926); Earl v. Dade
County, 92 Fla. 432, 109 So. 331 (1926).
16. Panama City v. State, 93 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1957) (validating revenue
bonds to construct a marina); Raney v. City of Lakeland, 88 So. 2d 148 (Fla.
1956) (approving a ninety-nine year lease by the city of Lakeland to a garden
club); State v. City of Miami, 72 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1954) (validating revenue certificates to finance a warehouse to be leased by the Orange Bowl); State v. Board
of Control, 66 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1953) (validating university dormitory revenue
certificates, which were actually used to construct a fraternity house); Overman v.
State Board of Control, 62 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1952) (approving funds for the state's
first accredited medical school). But see City of West Palm Beach v. State, 113
So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1959).
17. 122 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1960), appeal dismissed, 132 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1961).
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v. Paul,8 involving a privately run automobile raceway. The court
found a public purpose in Paul despite the fact that the raceway was
available to public use only three months a year. Less than one year
after Paul in Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach,19 the court disapproved municipal bonds for the purpose of establishing a spring
headquarters for the Pittsburgh Pirates.
A review of the recent cases shows the confusing muddle of tests
and conflicting interpretations which faced the court in the instant
case. In determining which test was applicable to the facts presented,
the court used the familiar test of primary public purpose vis-i-vis
incidental public purpose and found that the advertising benefit
accruing to the state was incidental rather than primary. Going beyond the primary-incidental public purpose test, however, the court
introduced a new criterion: Will the public maintain a reasonable
degree of control over the use of the money after it has been disbursed?
The public control test was the result of the court's effort to
distinguish Bailey v. City of Tampa 20 and Raney v. City of Lakeland.2These cases involved nonprofit corporations, but, unlike the present
case, the appropriations in Bailey and Raney were upheld. In Bailey,
the city of Tampa conveyed land to the Tampa Board of Trade for
construction of a building. The contract contained rigid specifications
of size, useful life, and cost in addition to a thirty-five year reverter
clause.2 2 The Bailey court upheld the appropriation on the basis that
it did not violate article IX, section 10, of the Florida Constitution,
which the court said was enacted to prevent debts by state and local
governments resulting from financial support of private commercial
enterprises.2 3 The court in the principal case distinguished Bailey
on the ground that no rigid construction specifications and reverter
clause were present in the Junior Chamber International appropriation. Raney v. City of Lakeland involved a municipal lease to the
Garden Club of Lakeland for construction of a public garden center,
clubhouse, and gardening library. The lease contained covenants
against assignment and subletting, a cancellation clause in case of
breach, and a provision for reverter to the city at the end of the lease.
The court distinguished Raney on the ground that the garden club
18. 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965). See Comment, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 708 (1966).
19. 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966); see Note, The "Public Purpose" and "Charitable"
Tax Exemptions in Florida, 19 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 330, 353-59 (1967).
20. 92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 119 (1926).
21.

88 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1956).

22. The reverter clause provided that within thirty-five years the building,
including the land, reverted free of cost to the city.
23. Bailey v. City of Tampa, 92 Fla. 1030, 111 So. 119 (1926).
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was "obligated to render a public service not limited to its own membership and was precluded from exploiting the land and its improvements for private gain." 24 The Junior Chamber International appropriation had no such restrictions.
At first glance it appears that the control requirement might severely limit the purposes for which public funds may be appropriated.
A closer examination, however, reveals that this is not necessarily true.
The court is merely requiring a more specific description of the purpose of the appropriations and more specific control by way of reverter clauses and the like. In a recent case the court first began laying
the foundation for the public control requirement: "[Pletitions for
validation of bonds and revenue certificates should set forth in reasonable detail the purpose, or purposes which will be accomplished
with the proceeds."25 The inference to be drawn from this statement
is that a detailed description of the purpose of the appropriation is
itself a measure of public control. Careful provisions for public control and more detailed descriptions of the purpose may thus save
many previously doomed projects.
Justice Ervin's dissent in the present decision expressed the fear
that an extension of the control doctrine may eventually end appropriations to state and local chambers of commerce.2 6 This fear is unfounded. The majority opinion offers public control as only one of
several factors to be used in determining public purpose. Greater
restrictions may be imposed on the purposes of such monies as a result
of the public control criterion, but a complete severance is unlikely.
With the ever-widening scope and cost of government, a limitation
on the rising number of tax exemptions and public appropriations
should be imposed. Public purpose is such a limitation and by necessity is a vague and changing concept. Modern criteria are necessary
in order for the public purpose limitation to retain validity. Eventually the legislature will be faced with the problem of establishing more
concrete guidelines. Until that time, the test of public control is a
step in the right direction.
WILLIAM L. KIRK, JR.

24. 198 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967).
25. State v. Suwannee County Dev. Authority, 122 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1960),
appeal dismissed, 132 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1961).
26. A suit has been instituted in the Ninth Judicial Circuit to enjoin Seminole County from disbursing money to the county chamber of commerce on
grounds of lack of public control. Telephone Conversation With Attorney Albert
Fitts, Sanford, Florida, March 16, 1967.
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